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INTRODUCTION
An extensive body of civil rights law exists in the United States today.
However, civil rights law would have little value if not for judicial
interpretation and judicial guidance concerning its application. Several
private organizations throughout the 20th century have been created with the
sole purpose of helping poor individuals and minorities enforce civil rights
law through the adjudicative system. One of these organizations is the
American Civil Liberties Union, which prides itself on litigating claims
which will yield great precedential value in the civil rights arena, thus
effecting widespread civil rights reform. However, with the increasing
popularity of informal means of resolving conflict, referred to as Alternative
Dispute Resolution, the American Civil Liberties Union has been faced with
the possibility that some civil rights disputes may be forced to resolution
through such informal processes; processes which lack the precedential
value required to make dramatic advancements in the field of civil rights
law. This paper addresses the broad question of whether Alternative Dispute
Resolution is an appropriate means by which civil rights controversies
should be resolved, and asks whether the use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution by the American Civil Liberties Union can be reconciled with the
objectives of the organization.
Section I examines the history, purpose, and methodology of the
American Civil Liberties Union. Section II discusses the historical
development and use of Alternative Dispute Resolution. Section III, Part A
provides examples of its use in environmental controversies, Americans with
Disabilities Act disputes, and employment conflicts. Section III, Part B
explains the arguments for and against the use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Civil Rights Controversies. Section IV, Part A looks at
examples of the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution by the American Civil
Liberties Union, while Part B provides insight into the interplay of
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Alternative Dispute Resolution and the mission of the American Civil
Liberties Union.
I. HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND METHODOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") was founded in 1920 by
Roger Baldwin, Crystal Eastman, and Albert DeSilver.1 The development of
this public interest organization centered around a concern for preserving
basic civil liberties that individuals perceived as threatened by the
government.2 Civil rights violations were rampant in American society
during this time period "as activists were.., jailed for distributing anti-war
literature," summary deportation of foreign-born individuals suspected of
"political radicalism" was commonplace, racial segregation was acceptable
practice, sex discrimination was essentially institutionalized, and the
Supreme Court had not yet addressed the issue of First Amendment
violations.' In preserving these basic liberties for the public as a whole, the
ACLU initially relied on enacting change primarily through the judicial
branch.4 In fact, the ACLU has been involved with some of the most
notorious cases in the history of American civil rights jurisprudence, and has
had much success.'
Today, the stated mission of the ACLU is "to defend and preserve the
individual rights and liberties guaranteed to all people in this country by the
* Amber McKinney is a juris doctorate candidate at Pepperdine University School of Law
who will graduate in May 2006. She would like to thank her parents, Dennis and Nancy, and her
sister Katheleen for their unconditional love and support.
1. Freedom is Why We're Here (ACLU, New York, N.Y.) (Fall 1999),
http://www.aclu.org/about/aboutmain.cfm (follow "Freedom Is Why We're Here" hyperlink).
2. Id. at 4. The ACLU originally sought to defend free speech during World War I. SAMUEL
WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 3 (Oxford Univ. Press
1990). Later on, during the period of its founding, the ACLU shifted its focus from the inappropriate
suppression of anti-war literature, the automatic deportation of immigrants who expressed politically
radical views, racial segregation, and discrimination against women. Id.
3. Freedom is Why We're Here, supra note 1, at 2.
4. See WALKER, supra note 2, at 3-4. In the 1920s alone, the ACLU was involved in several
infamous cases, among which were the 1925 Scopes trial, in which charges brought against biology
teacher John T. Scopes for "violating a [state] ban on the teaching of evolution" were dropped, and
the 1933 Ulysses case in which the ACLU supported a successful anti-censorship battle waged
against a "U.S. Customs Service ban on the sale of the James Joyce novel Ulysses ...." Freedom is
Why We're Here, supra note 1, at 2-3.
5. Freedom is Why We're Here, supra note 1, at 2-3. The ACLU was involved with the
Scopes trial, the Ulysses case, protesting the internment of Japanese Americans, Brown v. Board of
Education, and more recently, the flag burning cases. Id. In fact, the ACLU was involved with
more than 80% of the "landmark" cases cited in constitutional law textbooks, and many Supreme
Court opinions have been influenced by ACLU briefs. WALKER, supra note 2, at 4.
110
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Constitution and laws of the United States."6 Namely, the ACLU seeks to
preserve the protections and guarantees of the Bill of Rights from
overreaching by the majority.7  The ACLU achieves this goal by both
lobbying Congress and by selecting to take on only those lawsuits which
will establish new precedents, thereby having the greatest impact in the
preservation of civil liberties.8 However, only a limited number of the cases
selected will actually make it to trial, and the ACLU will often be forced to
resolve such controversies through some process of alternative dispute
resolution. When the lawsuits which the ACLU represents do not make it to
the final stages of the judicial process and are instead resolved through the
process of dispute resolution, an issue is raised as to whether the mission of
the ACLU is truly served. 9
II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Alternative Dispute Resolution has evolved over the years to become a
widely accepted and commonly used form for resolving disputes outside of
the adjudicatory setting. This section looks at the historical development of
Alternative Dispute Resolution and examines some forms of dispute
resolution and their uses.
6. Freedom is Why We're Here, supra note 1, at 1. The ACLU characterizes itself as one of
this "nation's most conservative organization[s]," believing that its "job is to conserve America's
original civic values-the Constitution and Bill of Rights-and defend the rights of every man,
woman, and child in this country." Id.
7. See id. at 1-2. Some examples of the rights which the ACLU fights to protect include First
Amendment rights (freedom of speech, association, and assembly, as well as freedom of press and
religion), Equal Protection rights (the right to "equal treatment, regardless of race, sex, religion, or
national origin"), the right to Due Process (ensuring the "fair treatment by the government [where]
the loss of one's property or liberty are at stake"), and the right to privacy (protecting the individual
from "unwarranted government intrusion into [one's] personal and private affairs"). Id. at 2.
8. Id. at 4. The infrastructure of the ACLU consists of a national board of directors, which
establishes policy, a legislative office in Washington D.C. whose function is to lobby Congress, and
a legal department located in New York that oversees Supreme Court litigation. Id. In addition, the
ACLU has a 50-state network of affiliate offices that are fully staffed and operate autonomously on a
local community level. Id. While collectively referred to as the "ACLU," the organization is
actually "comprised of two separate entities, the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU
Foundation." American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU Foundation: What's the Difference?
(2004), http://www.aclu.org/about/acluf.html. Legislative lobbying is engaged in by the ACLU,
while litigation and communications operations are supervised by the ACLU Foundation. Id.
9. For example, the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution is often compelled in employment
discrimination cases, or may occur in the form of settlement conferences. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative
Dispute Resolution § 3 (May 2005).
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A. The Development ofAlternative Dispute Resolution
The phrase "Alternative Dispute Resolution" ("ADR") refers to the use
of methods other than traditional adversarial proceedings in the judicial
forum to resolve disputes.'0 From a historical perspective, the process of
ADR is not a revolutionary concept, as several groups in society have
preferred to settle disputes outside of the litigational setting." Hebrew and
Christian traditions have always been of the belief that one should not be
allowed into court unless one has first attempted some sort of
reconciliation--"the [preferred] procedure involves, first, conversation; if
that fails, it involves mediation; if mediation fails, it involves airing the
dispute before representatives of the community."' 2 The Puritans, Quakers,
and Dutch settlers in early America practiced mediation, arbitration, and
conciliation, resorting to use of the legal system only when these methods of
ADR failed.' 3 Mormons and Chinese and Jewish immigrants received much
societal hostility during the nineteenth century, and in response, formed their
own methods of community ADR so as to avoid involvement in the general
legal system. 14
In the 1970s, ADR was seen as an effective means of "providing [more
affordable] and less formal methods [of] resolving disputes for ... the poor
and middle-class by alleviating the often inaccessible nature of the judicial
system."' 5 Lawyers and scholars alike took part in a momentous movement
towards the incorporation of ADR procedures into an "overburdened" legal
system, which they viewed as incapable of addressing the legal disputes of
10. 4 AM. J. JuRIs. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution Summary (May 2005). See also Allison
Balc, Making It Work at Work: Mediation's Impact on Employee/Employer Relationships and
Mediator Neutrality, 2 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 241, 241-42 (2002) (citing Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651 (Supp. 2000)) ("[D]efines ADR as including any 'process
or procedure, other than an adjudication by a presiding judge, in which a neutral third party
participates to assist in the resolution of issues in controversy, through processes such as early
neutral evaluation, mediation, mini-trial, and arbitration."').
11. Corinne Cooper, Justice Without Law? A Search Through History for Contemporary
Solutions, 48 ALB. L. REv. 741, 741-62 (Fall 1983).
12. Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1666
(1985).
13. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 4-6 (Oxford Univ. Press 1983)
(1976).
14. See id. at 6.
15. Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 905, 906 (1979). At an American Bar Association
Conference, Chief Justice Warren Burger stated that "the notion that ordinary people want black-
robed judges, well-dressed lawyers and fine-paneled courtrooms as the setting to resolve their
disputes isn't correct. People with problems, like people with pains, want relief and they want it as
quickly and inexpensively as possible." Id. at 905 n. 1. Similarly, consumer advocate Ralph Nader
noted that "the legal system must be designed to encourage the nonlegal resolution of disputes, and
public participation in planning processes .. " Id. at 905 n.2.
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the less powerful and affluent in society. 16 This movement was sparked by
the Pound Conference, convened by Chief Justice Warren Burger to
commemorate a famous 1906 speech by Dean Roscoe Pound, which called
for solutions to a justice system that was overextended and inefficient. 17 The
Pound Conference issued some rather influential recommendations
advocating the increased use of alternatives to traditional methods of dispute
resolution.
18
By 1980, Congress passed the Dispute Resolution Act to provide for
inexpensive means to settle basic disputes.19 The Reagan Administration
was extremely enthusiastic about the possibility of using less formal means
of dispute resolution, presumably because a lesser degree of confrontation
experienced between the government and the people meant "an amelioration
of the so-called heavy hand of government and greater acceptance by the
16. Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights
Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 482, 494 (1987).
17. Id. at 493 n.72. In his famous 1906 address entitled The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
With the Administration of Justice, Dean Roscoe Pound stated:
[O]ur system of courts is archaic and our procedure behind the times. Uncertainty, delay
and expense, and above all, the injustice of deciding cases upon points of practice, which
are the mere etiquette of justice, direct results of the organization of our courts and the
backwardness of our procedure, have created a deep-seated desire to keep out of court.
Id. Chief Justice Burger further expounded on this principle in a 1982 address to the American Bar
Association, stating, "[e]ven when an acceptable result is finally achieved in a civil case, that result
is often drained of much of its value because of the time lapse, the expense, and the emotional stress
inescapable in the litigation process." Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J.
274, 275 (1982). And the Chief Justice even quoted Abraham Lincoln, who urged the public to
"[d]iscourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to
them how the nominal winner is often a real loser-in fees, expenses, and waste of time." Id.
18. See Silver, supra note 16, at 494 n.72 (citing William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference
Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277,
280 (1978)). The Pound Conference Recommendations suggested that the overburdened court
system was unable to give the requisite amount of attention required by each case, and that
alternative dispute resolution procedures might provide the justice system with an opportunity to
examine certain substantive areas with a greater level of expertise, while simultaneously providing
an inexpensive and less time consuming method of resolving disputes. See id.
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 2(a). "It is the purpose of this Act to assist the States and other interested
parties in providing to all persons convenient access to dispute resolution mechanisms which are
effective, fair, inexpensive, and expeditious." 28 U.S.C. § 2(b). Such dispute resolution
mechanisms were defined to include "a forum which provides for arbitration, mediation,
conciliation, or a similar procedure .. " 28 U.S.C. § 3(4)(B). The Act was intended to give the
states and the private sector incentives to create new approaches to dispute resolution. However,
Congress never provided funding for the statute, so its passage was in vain. See AUERBACH, supra
note 13, at 136-37.
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electorate of ultimate results."2 °  The Administration also believed that
informal dispute resolution could increase the efficiency and decrease the
expense involved in the justice system.2' In addition, as early as 1983,
around thirty-eight law schools offered courses in interviewing, counseling,
and negotiation.22 Today, more than ninety-four percent of law schools offer
courses in dispute resolution,23 and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 1998 requires all federal district courts to provide for at least one form of
ADR. 4 Thus, ADR has become a widely accepted alternative to more
traditional, adversarial courtroom procedures.
B. Forms ofAlternative Dispute Resolution and Their Uses
While various methods of ADR exist, all ADR processes share similar
characteristics. Generally, ADR is defined as any "process or procedure
other than an adjudication by a presiding judge, in which a neutral third
party participates to assist in the resolution of issues in controversy, through
processes such as ... mediation... and arbitration .... 25 Most obviously,
ADR was developed as a reaction to the shortcomings of the formal
litigation process.26 However, beyond this, all methods of ADR have the
goal of resolving disputes through more efficient and less costly means than
litigation. 27  Also, most ADR methods may be facilitated without a judge
and with minimal judicial involvement.28 In addition, ADR shifts the focus
20. Silver, supra note 16, at 496. The motivations for the support provided by the
conservative Reagan Administration for informal dispute resolution did not go without great
scrutiny: "It has also been suggested that some of these people who promote ADR as a means to
serve the poor and oppressed in society are in fact principally motivated by a desire to limit the work
of the courts in areas affecting minority interests, civil rights, and civil liberties." Harry T. Edwards,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 668-69 (1986).
However, such criticism was somewhat unfounded. See id.
21. See Silver, supra note 16, at 496.
22. See Martha Middleton, 69 A.B.A. J. 881, 884 (July 1983). By 1983, Harvard Law School
was even offering seven courses in mediation, a negotiation workshop, and interdisciplinary
approaches to settling disputes. See id.
23. See Richard N. Pearson, ABA Analysis of the Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America,
432 PRAc. LAW. INST. 11, 16 (Mar.-Apr. 1992).
24. See Barbara Chvany, Using Mediation Effectively, 625 PRAC. LAW. INST. 745, 747 (Mar.
2000). By the time 28 U.S.C. § 651 was passed, over half of the ninety-four district courts
nationwide already had mediation programs in place. See id. at 747. See also 28 U.S.C. § 651(b).
25. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651 (Supp. 2000).
26. See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality ofAlternative Dispute Resolution. 62 TUL. L.
REv. 1, 11 (1987).
27. See id
28. See id. at 11-12. Instead of a judge, most methods of ADR use a mediator or facilitator to
help the parties reach a mutual agreement. However, a judge may determine those questions of law
or fact that arise during the ADR process and which require judicial resolution. See id
6
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away from attorney representation and places it instead on the client, who is
empowered with the ability to control his fate.29 All ADR mechanisms are
informal in nature and involve private proceedings.3 ° And finally, ADR
places more emphasis on obtaining a resolution to a dispute, as opposed to
applying the relevant substantive law to the controversy at hand.3'
The most common methods of ADR include mediation, arbitration, and
settlement conferences.32 Mediation involves the use of a neutral third party
who assists adverse parties in their pursuit of a mutual agreement.33
However, the power wielded by this third party is limited, as he or she may
not impose a decision upon the adverse parties unless those parties reach an
agreement on their own accord. This power is also limited by the fact that in
a majority of jurisdictions, mediation is engaged in on a voluntary basis.34
However, if a mediator is able to facilitate an agreement, the mediation may
act as a substitute for formal adjudication.35 Mediation is the most useful in
dealing with complex controversies requiring a fact-intensive, case-by-case
approach. 6
29. See id. The rationale behind this movement away from attorney-controlled outcomes
stems from a belief that parties involved in a controversy are in the best position to resolve their
problems. See id. Also, negotiation is seen as a universal skill of which most individuals have a
functional understanding of the dynamics involved. See id.
30. See Brunet, supra note 26, at 12-13. ADR lacks the procedural characteristics of formal
litigation, including discovery. See id. at 13. And ADR is private in that it is often conducted out-
of-court and in the office of a mediator, attorney, or even the litigant; in fact, various ADR
procedures require that ADR meetings and decisions remain private and confidential. See id.
31. Seeid. at 13-14.
32. See 4 AM. JUR. 2D Mediation; Role of Mediators § 3 (May 2004).
33. See id. The mediator will often be responsible for helping the parties identify the major
issues in dispute, suggesting alternative agreements, explaining the consequences that will ensue
from not settling, and will encourage settlement between the parties. See id. See also Richard
Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1363 (1985) ("In mediation, a neutral, noncoercive,
nonadversarial third party coordinates and facilitates negotiations between disputants").
34. See Brearton, supra note 32. In addition, the powers of a mediator are limited in that he or
she may not compel production, and must be invited to intervene by the parties to the dispute
themselves. See id.
35. Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator Accountability, 4
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 521 (1991).
36. Judith Cohen, The ADA Mediation Guidelines: A Community Collaboration Moves the
Field Forward, 2 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (2001). Mediation is an interest-based
process, and is thus ideal for use in cases dealing with ADA complaints, whose fact patterns vary
extensively according to the disabilities involved, and the appropriation remedies to be enacted. Id.
Mediation is also commonly used in resolving consumer grievances and domestic disputes.
Delgado, supra note 33, at 1363-64.
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Arbitration is a trial-type proceeding conducted in lieu of traditional
judicial proceedings, and is a less formal, less expensive, and less time-
consuming process than a normal trial.37 As in mediation, a neutral third
party arbitrator is appointed to oversee resolution of the dispute, and this
third party is often a reputable lawyer, law professor, or formal judge with
expertise in the area of dispute. 8 The process of arbitration may vary
depending on whether it is private or judicial arbitration,3 9 but, in general,
the arbitrator may wield much more power than a mediator; most
importantly, the decision rendered upon the parties by the arbitrator is
binding in all future judicial proceedings. 40  However, the trend among
academics and practitioners is a preference for the use of more flexible,
mediation-like approaches to ADR, while the courts continue to encourage
the proliferation and use of arbitration in such areas as "consumer, banking,
health, employment, securities, and franchise contracts." 4 1
37. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 8 (1995). Arbitration usually lasts around
four to five months, versus the average of several years required to resolve a dispute via the litigation
process. Id. Also, the American Arbitration Association only requires that the parties pay for a
small filing fee, and the arbitrator will often work without compensation to enhance his professional
experience. Id. Compare Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its
Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1888 (1997) ("Indeed,
practitioners of arbitration still debate whether arbitration is a settlement device that ensures earlier
trial dates and forces the parties to focus on their cases or an adjudication process (providing the
satisfaction of a third-party hearing and ruling, with a 'day in court')").
38. 4 AM JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 8 (1995).
39. Private or contractual arbitration is the most common form of arbitration, which only relies
upon the judicial system for enforcement of decisions rendered by the arbitrator. 4 AM JUR. 2D
Alternative Dispute Resolution § 9 (1995). Thus, the adverse parties may fashion the arbitration
proceedings according to their preferences (i.e., they may limit the issues to be heard). Id. On the
other hand, judicial arbitration is prescribed by the court, and is thus not a true form of ADR. 4 AM
JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 10 (1995). It differs from private arbitration in that the
final decision is not binding on the parties unless they wish for it to be. Id. In addition, a much
broader scope of discovery is allowed, and evidentiary rules are much stricter than in private
arbitration. Id.
40. 4 AM JuR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 8 (1995). See also Delgado, supra note 33,
at 1363 ("In arbitration, disputants submit their disagreement to an impartial third party and agree to
be bound by the arbitrator's decision, a decision that a court may enforce").
41. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37, at 1889. Support for more malleable forms of ADR, such
as mediation, is due in part to "the greater party control involved and the possibility of more
responsive and individually crafted outcomes (as well as the nonbinding quality of mediation)." Id.
at 1888. While the United States and California Supreme Courts continue to view arbitration as the
preferred method of ADR, the lower courts have grappled with the issue of employees or consumers
subject to arbitration clauses which they did not understand the meaning of when giving their
signature. Id. at 1889. However, "while arbitration is gaining court approval.., it is also fostering
an anti-ADR climate by promoting nonconsensual, even coercive, forms of dispute resolution." Id.
at 1889-90.
116
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A settlement conference takes place amidst the period of pretrial
proceedings, with the sole purpose of reaching an agreement before trial.42
During the conference, a settlement conference judge may take an active
part in negotiations in order to facilitate a compromise between adverse
parties, but the judge may not coerce or pressure the parties into an
agreement.43
Mediation, arbitration, and settlement conferences are only a few of the
available methods of ADR, but they are the most common forms of informal
dispute resolution used in the civil rights context. When referencing the
methods of ADR applied in the civil rights context, this article will be
impliedly referring to these three methods.
III. THE PROPRIETY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 1N CIVIL RIGHTS CONTROVERSIES
The civil rights body of law in the United States has gained much force
through various judicial decisions throughout the years. However, ADR
does not carry the legal force or precedent of a court decision, and thus an
issue arises as to whether ADR is indeed an effective tool for obtaining
advancements in the area of civil rights. This section details the use of ADR
in civil rights controversies, and then examines some of the arguments for
and against the use of ADR in the resolution of civil rights controversies.
A. Examples of ADR Use in Civil Rights Controversies
1. Environmental Controversies
The environmental justice movement incorporates a civil rights
dimension into the environmental rights forum.44 The movement stems from
the reality that low-income regions and communities of color are forced to
deal with greater environmental hazards than their predominantly white and
affluent neighbors.45 Generally, these white and affluent communities are
more politically powerful, and thus exert a greater degree of influence on the
42. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Pretrial Conference § 34 (1995).
43. Id.
44. E. Andrew Long, Protection of Minority Environmental Interests in the Administrative
Process: A Critical Analysis of the EPA's Guidance for Complaints Under Title VI, 39 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 1163, 1164 (2003).
45. CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY,
AND REGULATION 56-64 (2002).
117
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legislative decision-making process,4 6 which effectively concentrates a
higher degree of environmental hazards in those communities of the
politically powerless who are unable to fight this environmental
discrimination.4 7 The environmental justice movement thus works to correct
these inequities and address the problem of recurrent environmental
discrimination.48 One way for communities to seek recourse against those
facilitating the environmental discrimination is to challenge actions through
the EPA under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or ethnic origin in any program or
activity that receives federal funding. 9 In effect, communities may
challenge state environmental decisions through the EPA because state
environmental agencies not only receive federal funding, but any authoritr
which these agencies exercise has been delegated to them by the EPA. °
This is critical, because while private parties cannot challenge Title VI
violations, such as environmental discrimination, in court, the EPA's
complaint process affords individuals and communities the opportunity to
challenge state environmental agency action."
46. Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 646-47 (1992).
47. LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 74-78 (2001). See also
RECHTSCHAFFEN & GAUNA, supra note 45, at 27-53 (discussing political and other factors
contributing to environmental discrimination). For example, studies examining the correlation
between racial demographics and toxic waste siting reveal a strong correlation between
economically disadvantaged and communities of color and the presence of a high degree of
environmental hazards. Long, supra note 44, at 1166.
48. Long, supra note 44, at 1167.
49. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). The EPA promulgated regulations
under Title VI which state that "[n]o person shall be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, [or] be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving EPA
assistance on the basis of race, color, or national origin...." 40 C.F.R. § 7.30 (2004). In addition,
recipients of federal funding may not use discriminatory criteria or methods in choosing a site or the
location of a facility. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(c) (2004).
50. Long, supra note 44, at 1170. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 subjects all
operations of a state agency reliant upon federal funds to Title VI. Id. at 1171.
51. Id. at 1167. The United States Supreme Court has stated that Title VI, Section 601
"prohibits only intentional discrimination" and has held that Title VI does not create a "freestanding
private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under [Section 602]." Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280, 293 (2001). Title VI, Section 602 requires that agencies empowered to
allocate federal funds must "effectuate the provisions" of Section 601. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000).
In addition to statutory protection against environmental discrimination, the EPA created the
National Environmental Justice Advisory Council ("NEJAC") to advise the EPA regarding
environmental justice concerns; the NEJAC holds public meetings nationwide in an attempt to both
gain a better understanding of environmental discrimination in local communities and to find
solutions. RECHTSCHAFFEN & GAUNA, supra note 44, at 49. NEJAC is comprised of 25 members
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The EPA regulations promulgated under Title VI provide an outline for
informal complaint investigation procedures." One of these promulgations,
the Draft Revised Guidance for Investigating Title V1 Administrative
Complaints Challenging Permits ("Investigation Guidance"), provides a
structure for "[the EPA's] Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") to process
complaints filed under Title VI... and EPA's Title VI implementing
regulations alleging discriminatory effects ... [caused] by recipients of EPA
financial assistance. 53 The Title VI complaint process includes seven steps,
all of which encourage the use of informal dispute resolution and voluntary
compliance: the EPA will (1) acknowledge the complaint, (2) decide
whether to accept, reject, or refer the complaint, (3) investigate the
complaint, (4) make a preliminary finding of whether the recipient is in
compliance following investigation, (5) if necessary, will issue a formal
finding of noncompliance, (6) will allot a ten-day period, during which
voluntary compliance or agreement with the EPA may occur, and (7) afford
a hearing/appeal process to those who fail to voluntarily comply.
5 4
It is before the third step, investigation of an accepted complaint, that
the EPA Investigation Guidance states that "[wihenever possible, OCR
[shall] attempt to resolve complaints informally. 55  This "[I]nformal
resolution may occur through one of two approaches; under the first
approach, the complainant and the alleged offender may reach an informal
agreement.56 In order to reach this informal agreement, the OCR encourages
who do not come from the EPA, and thus provides a fresh prospective for the agency concerning the
discrimination problems faced by the people in disadvantaged communities. Id.; see also U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Justice (2005),
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/index.html (Feb. 19, 2005).
52. 40 C.F.R. § 7.120 (2002).
53. Environmental Protection Agency, Draft Revised Guidance for Investigating Title VI
Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,668 (June 27, 2000) [hereinafter
EPA Guidance Document]. This guidance document includes an explanation of how the EPA
determines whether to accept a complaint, how the EPA will attempt to address and resolve the
complaint, how the complaint will be investigated, how the EPA will conduct an "adverse disparate
impact analysis," and how the EPA determines whether there has indeed been noncompliance with
Title VI and EPA regulations. Long, supra note 44, at 1174-75.
54. Long, supra note 44, at 1175-80.
55. EPA Guidance Document, supra note 53, at 39, 696. In other words, prior to investigating
a complaint that it has accepted, the OCR of the EPA will make an initial attempt to resolve the
dispute informally. Long, supra note 44, at 1177; see also 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(d)(2) (2002) and 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994).
56. Long, supra note 44, at 1177.
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the use of ADR techniques,57 and the EPA will provide support should the
parties decide to use ADR techniques.5 In the second approach, informal
resolution of the complaint may be carried out in the absence of the
complainant.59 The EPA Investigation Guidance provides that participation
from the complainant will be sought where the "facts and circumstances"
deem such participation necessary and appropriate, and thus provides
significant leeway for the OCR and the alleged offender to resolve the
complaint without the complainant's participation or consent.6°
However, there are potential problems with addressing community
complaints through the use of ADR. It has been argued that the EPA's
Investigation Guidance (1) fails to account for the "resource and power
disparities between a state environmental agency" and aggrieved
community, (2) restricts community participation in the resolution process,
and (3) exacerbates the difficulty of addressing minority interests in the
environmental justice arena.6'
Substantial disparity exists between the powerful position of the state
environmental agency and that of low-income regions and communities of
color.62 Poor or impoverished communities do not have the resources
(financial or otherwise) required to conduct the comprehensive scientific
studies needed to support a claim of an environmental violation amounting
57. Long, supra note 44, at 1177 (citing EPA Guidance Document, supra note 53, at 39,673).
"ADR includes a variety of approaches including the use of a third party neutral acting as a mediator
or the use of a structured process through which the parties can participate in shared learning and
creative problem solving to reach a consensus." EPA Guidance Document, supra note 53, at 39,673.
58. EPA Guidance Document, supra note 53, at 39,673.
59. Long, supra note 44, at 1177 (citing EPA Guidance Document, supra note 53, at 39,673).
60. Id. (citing EPA Guidance Document, supra note 53, at 39,673-74). However, an
additional safeguard is provided in that "before any agreement between the recipient and OCR can
be reached, an investigation may be needed to determine the appropriate relief and/or corrective
action necessary to eliminate or reduce to the extent required by Title VI the adverse disparate
impacts." EPA Guidance Document, supra note 53 at 39,673. In addition, the Investigation
Guidance suggests that, "while the plan may be developed without consulting with complainants or
others, EPA expects that informal resolution will be more successful if recipients work with OCR,
complainants, and other appropriate parties to develop a plan for eliminating or reducing the alleged
adverse disparate impact." Id. at 39,674.
61. Long, supra note 44, at 1189. In fact, the National Environmental Justice Advisory
Council (NEJAC) (which advises the EPA on civil rights matters) criticized the Investigation
Guidance, stating "[b]ecause the Guidance is a significant step backward by EPA, and would
virtually ensure that no Title VI civil rights complaint filed with EPA would ever be successful, we
request that EPA scrap the current Guidance and begin again." Id. at 1188-89 (citing NEJAC,
Comments of the National Environmental Justice Advisory Committee Title VI Task Force, at 2
(2002), available at http://www.eps.gov/ocrpagel/docs/t6com2000_021.pdf (last visited Jan. 13,
2005) [hereinafter NEJAC, Comments].
62. Long, supra note 44, at 1189.
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to discrimination,63 and thus do not have as much "evidence" to bring to the
bargaining table as do state environmental agencies, which specialize in
obtaining information about environmental issues.64 Unfortunately, the EPA
Investigation Guidelines do not provide for a means of assisting
complainants in data compilation,65 which could effectively place the
complainant in a bargaining position comparable to that of the other parties
involved. This relates to the issue of whether ADR successfully protects the
civil rights of those communities suffering from environmental
discrimination. ADR is a confidential process, and thus any discriminatory
or unfair events that occur during the negotiation proceedings may be hidden
from public scrutiny and investigation, leaving the disadvantaged
community with "little or no redress., 66  ADR is thus extremely
inappropriate in civil rights cases, such as those dealing with environmental
discrimination, "because of the high level of public interest and concern in
the issues involved and its outcome, 67  and because ADR, unlike
adjudication, does not keep a formal record. Thus the public has no way of
accessing all proceedings, decisions, or events of the case.68 In addition,
ADR tends to narrow its focus on the resolution of individual disputes,
instead of addressing the overall pattern of discrimination that may be
practiced by the offender, and thereby fails to fulfill the goal of the EPA's
Title VI: to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, or ethnic
origin in any program or activity that receives federal funding.69 Each
63. Long, supra note 44, at 1189-90. Even where a community is able to produce scientific
data, it is unlikely that this information will be viewed as credibly as information provided by the
state.
64. Id. at 1190-91. An unequal bargaining position is created where a disparity of resources
exists between complainant and the alleged offender, especially where the offender is the only party
in a position to provide scientific data, and the negotiations must then rely solely upon the
information provided by the offender. Id. See also Bradford C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon of
Siting and Cleaning up Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Mediation Slay the
Monster?, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 239, 280 (1991) ("for many citizen groups, individual
citizens, and even municipalities, the costs of obtaining technical information or hiring an
experienced negotiator may be too great, leaving most [offenders] with a distinct advantage.").
65. Id. at 1192.
66. Mank, supra note 64, at 280-81.
67. NEJAC, Comments, supra note 61, at 24 (2002). In contrast to a civil rights case
addressed through the use of ADR, "[i]f formally adjudicated in the administrative process, the
public may have full access to all proceedings, decisions, and events of the case." Id.
68. Long, supra note 44, at 1193. If a record were made available to the public, as in formal
adjudication, "the EPA could receive comments on how to improve future results or the community
could point to the decision it challenges." Id.
69. NEJAC, Comments, supra note 61, at 23.
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community must negotiate its own position, with whatever insufficient
resources that it may have at its disposal, and without the benefit of the
uniformity or precedent that are typical of judicial decisions. 70  To make
matters worse, ADR lacks the procedural safeguards included in the more
formal dispute resolution methods, processes which are intended to protect
the rights of minorities.7
Thus, the use of ADR in environmental justice disputes brought before
the EPA is marked by a disparity in the relative resources and bargaining
power of the parties involved. This amounts to the creation of
discrimination within the context of attempting to resolve a civil rights
controversy. Unfortunately for the disadvantaged parties or communities
involved, there is no opportunity to build upon precedent and previous
successes, as in the civil rights movements of the past. Instead, ADR forces
the community to engage in a "case-by-case" system of negotiation with an
alleged offender who is in a much greater position of influence.72 In effect,
the use of ADR in environmental controversies may be deemed
inappropriate, or at the very least, insufficient.
One manner in which minority rights may be protected to a greater
degree would be to provide for "administrative adjudicative processes under
Title VI," instead of ADR.73 Most importantly, administrative proceedings
would not only be open to greater public participation than ADR
proceedings, but they would also afford complainant communities with a
body of precedent upon which decisions could be based, and upon which the
environmental justice movement could be built.7 4 In fact, the establishment
70. Id. at 24. See also Long, supra note 44, at 1192 ("ADR is essentially a private resolution
of a single case and does not ordinarily dictate that similar cases should be decided on the same
principles. Therefore, each complainant must negotiate its own position without relying on earlier
solutions to the same problem, which may not even be made public. In this way, repeated
discriminatory actions by a single [offender] may be more easily obscured.").
71. Long, supra note 44, at 1193. For example, ADR processes are informal, "and, aside from
arbitration, cannot impose penalties on the parties. The informality... may encourage the recipient
to take advantage of its stronger bargaining position." Id. This inhibits a community's battle for its
civil rights in that "[an offender] may attempt to take advantage of the complainant, knowing that if
it fails, it can simply refuse to settle with the complainant and deal with the EPA instead." Id. See
also Mank, supra note 64, at 280 ("An important issue in this controversy has been the extent to
which . . . mediation . . . can overcome differences among parties in monetary, technical, and
informational resources . . . the informal atmosphere of mediation may fool less sophisticated
parties... and lead them to accept a less favorable resolution than they could have achieved through
litigation.")
72. Long, supra note 44, at 1194.
73. Tseming Yang, The Form and Substance of Environmental Justice: The Challenge of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 For Environmental Regulation, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 143,
219 (2002).
74. Long, supra note 44, at 1207. "The dangers of a case-by-case approach would be reduced
with a significant body of precedent on which to base each decision." Id.
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of clear rules and principles may even provide an opportunity for
communities to ensure uniformity and consistency in future cases where
their civil rights have been violated, an opportunity that is not created where
ADR is used to address civil rights controversies in the environmental
arena.
7 5
2. Americans with Disabilities Act Controversies
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") protects the civil rights
of the disabled. "The ADA prohibits discrimination against persons with
disabilities in employment (Title I), governmental programs and services
(Title II), public accommodations and services (hotels, restaurants, retail
stores, service establishments and other public facilities) (Title III), and
telecommunications (Title IV)."76 The ADA is also the first civil rights
statute to expressly encourage the use of ADR in the settlement of disputes
under its purview." The text of the ADA actually references a wide array of
ADR techniques, including mediation, arbitration, and mini-trials. 8
Congress incorporated a variety of ADR methods into the ADA due to
its belief that informal dispute resolution could alleviate the potential
overflow of disability cases into the already overburdened court system.79 In
addition, a variety of disabilities require a case-by-case approach, which
makes "interest-based" processes, such as mediation and other ADR
75. Id
76. Lawrence P. Postol & David D. Kadue, An Employer's Guide to the Americans With
Disabilities Act: From Job Qualifications to Reasonable Accommodations, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
693, 694 (1991).
77. Cohen, supra note 36, at 3. See also Loren K. Allison & Eric H.J. Stahlhut, Arbitration
and the ADA: Do the Two Make Strange Bedfellows?, 37 RES GESTAE 168 (1993) ("The text of the
ADA, and its legislative history, reflects the intent of its drafters that alternative dispute resolution
be used to resolve allegations of disability discrimination.").
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12212. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 pt. 3 at 76-77 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 499-500 (stating in part that this ADR provision was adopted by the Committee
while considering the ADA in order to encourage the use of alternative dispute resolution in
addressing ADA controversies. The Committee reiterates that this ADR provision is consistent with
the Supreme Court interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Title I of the ADA
incorporates the remedial provisions of Title VII by reference). See also The Civil Rights Act of
1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991), where Congress encouraged the use of ADR in various other civil
rights statutes.
79. Cohen, supra note 36, at 5 (citing U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges FY 1992-FY 1999, available at
www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2006)).
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80techniques, more appropriate for parties than adjudicatory processes.
However, ADR often fails to sufficiently address legal and public policy
interests, thereby rendering it an ineffective way to deal with civil rights
complaints brought by the disabled.8' In addition, ADA dispute issues may
arguably be considered public policy concerns, and thus the private
proceeding so characteristic of ADR may be an inappropriate manner in
which to address concerns which may be relevant in the lives of various
individuals.8 2
The ADA Mediation Guidelines ("Guidelines") were developed by a
group of twelve mediators known as the ADA Mediation Guidelines Work
Group, and stemmed from informal discussions regarding the lack of
standardized procedures in ADA mediations.8 3 Such guidelines were
necessary given the ambiguity with which entities were faced when
attempting to mediate ADA claims. Going back to the early 1990s, when
the ADA was enacted, agencies were forced to develop their own standards
for applying ADR to ADA claim settlement. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") launched the first ADA mediation
program in 1991,84 however, the ADA had just been passed and the EEOC
could not be expected to have experience dealing with the provisional
requirements of the ADA. Also, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ")
started a training program for instructing experienced mediators to mediate
claims under Titles II and III, and was successful in providing support for
mediators where they had questions pertaining to the legal aspects of the
ADA.85 Eventually, agencies responsible for enforcing civil rights statutes,
80. Id. at 6.
81. Id. "[ADR] providers and users must be aware of risks to the rights of disputants,
plaintiffs and defendants alike, when safeguards and quality control measures are not established."
Id. For example, many mediators who handle ADA cases lack either legal experience in dealing
with disability claims or knowledge of disability issues; even those mediators with experience and
expertise in the area of disability law may not understand the unique issues involved in this newly
developed field of mediation. Id.
82. Cohen, supra note 36, at 9.
83. Id.
84. U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission, History of EEOC Mediation Program, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/history.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2005); see also Ann C. Hodges,
Mediation and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 30 GA. L. REV. 431,442-451 (1996).
85. Hodges, supra note 84, at 453-54. The article explains that the purpose of the DOJ
program is:
[T]o train a select number of professional mediators nationwide about Title III of the
ADA, refer Title III cases to these mediators for mediation, monitor the outcome of
mediation efforts, and evaluate and disseminate the evaluation of the project to mediators
and other interested parties nationwide, so that the project can be effectively replicated in
other areas of the country.
Id.
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including EEOC, DOJ, and some state and local agencies, instituted more
formal ADR programs during the early 1990s. These programs typically
provided for in-house mediators and "external pro bono mediators. 86
However, while these agencies were established to investigate and advocate
in the civil rights field, conflicting interests arose due to a preoccupation
with settlement numbers.87 Feeling the pressure to settle cases, these
agencies, whose traditional duties included enforcing the law and public
policy, were oftentimes faced with the reality of compromising the civil
rights of complainants for the sake of expediency and efficiency.
To help avoid this conflict of interest, cases were often referred from the
agency to more traditional mediation organizations, which had begun to
offer ADA mediation in the mid-1990s. 88 In addition, the federal court
mediation programs addressed ADA mediation cases in addition to their
regular caseload. 89  Unfortunately, while many of these independent
programs provided training to mediators in the areas of civil rights and
disability law, many mediators handling ADA cases were inept when
dealing disability claims or issues. Even those mediators who were capable
of dealing with disability cases still lacked experience in addressing the
issues that arose under the provisions of the newly enacted ADA.9°
Despite these flaws in the use of ADR in ADA disputes, several federal
agencies began to provide for mediation to resolve ADA controversies.9' It
was the passage of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act and the
EEOC's revision of its rules governing ADA complaints that encouraged
agencies to incorporate ADR mechanisms into its ADA dispute resolution
process.92 However, still lacking were clear guidelines as to how to utilize
ADR in settling ADA disputes, and thus the civil rights of the disabled
86. Cohen, supra note 36, at 10.
87. Id.
88. Id. Such traditional mediation organizations included community mediation and private
mediators, whose programs "focused on ADA mediation and offered specialized training." Id.
89. Id. at 11.
90. Id. at 12. As Franck Scardilli, Senior Staff Counsel and Chief Circuit Mediator for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated, "[w]ith ADA cases, specific criteria
have to be met ... [iut is important that the mediator understand this and be aware of the elements of
a cause of action under the ADA and case precedent." Id.
91. Id. Examples of agencies who made extensive use of ADR techniques in the resolution of
ADA controversies included the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Veterans Affairs,
the U.S. Postal Service, the General Accounting Office, the Department of Energy, the Internal
Revenue Service, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Department of Health and
Human Services. Id.
92. Id.
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individual were protected to different degrees depending on the agency
mediating the individual's claim.
The ADA Mediation Guidelines Work Group ("Work Group")
formulated the ADA Mediation Guidelines in an attempt to clear up the
ambiguity associated with the use of ADR techniques in civil rights
controversies, such as those arising under the ADA. In developing the
Guidelines, the Work Group met with mediation leaders to obtain advice and
ideas, and made a draft of the Guidelines available on both the internet and
in various periodicals.93 Before finalizing the Guidelines, the Work Group
revised them to account for the substantial number of written and verbal
comments received in response to publication of the rough draft.94 This
tedious drafting process was designed to ensure that all issues involved with
the use of ADR in ADA disputes were adequately addressed.
The Guidelines ensure that several safeguards are in place to protect the
civil rights of the disabled complainant in ADA disputes. For instance, the
Guidelines discuss those characteristics that a mediator should look for in
assessing whether a complainant has the capacity to be included in the
mediation process, or whether the complainant is of an impaired capacity
and thus requires some level of accommodation before he or she may be able
to participate.95 In addition, the Guidelines also provide that in ADA
mediation practice, a resource person or neutral expert should be brought
into the ADR process where the parties and their representatives do not have
the resources required to provide all information that is necessary regarding
the severity of the disability involved.96 However, the Guidelines do have
several shortcomings in terms of civil rights protection. For one thing, no
suggestion is made that the mediator should research the disability at issue in
an attempt to gain a better understanding of the overall dispute, and
ultimately gain an adequate level of competency in resolving the issue under
the provisions of the ADA.97 An uninformed mediator could encourage an
inadequate remedy for the disabled individual whose civil rights have been
violated. Also, the Guidelines are unclear as to whether a mediator should
or should not provide information to the parties relating to the legal aspects
of the dispute or the disability involved, which could prove crucial to the
93. Id. at 24 n.22. A rough draft of the Guidelines was published in such periodicals as the
New York Law Journal, Employment in the Mainstream, The Journal of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Employment, and Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation. Id.
94. ADA Mediation Guidelines, http://www.mediate.com/articles/adaltr.cfm? (last visited Jan.
3, 2005).
95. ABA Commission on Law and Aging, available at http://www.abanet.org/ (last visited
Jan. 3, 2005).
96. Cohen, supra note 36, at 9.
97. Id.
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disabled individual who is completely unfamiliar with the process of
negotiating an ADA claim. 98  The Guidelines may also be inadequate in
addressing the role of the mediator where representatives, legal or otherwise,
do not accurately represent the interests of the disabled complainant with a
diminished capacity.99 Such a complainant surely suffers a civil rights
violation in such an instance.
Given the extensive amount of research and thorough evaluation that
went into the development of the Guidelines, and the fact that the Guidelines
are still lacking adequate safeguards to protect the civil rights of the disabled
complainant, it seems likely that the ADR guidelines promulgated by
individual civil rights enforcement agencies are also inadequate in ensuring
the civil rights of the disabled ADA complainant are not further violated
during the mediation process. To remedy these shortcomings, agencies and
organizations engaged in ADA mediation could establish basic
qualifications for mediators (in terms of what mediators can contribute to the
process (i.e., knowledge of ADA mediation, experience dealing with
disabilities), create procedures for determining whether conflicts of interest
exist for external ADA mediators who depend on the employer for repeat
business, and determine how to engage parties in informed decision-making,
among other things. Such procedures could help ensure that the civil rights
of disabled complainants are not violated in the resolution of ADA claims.
3. Employment Controversies
The workplace is a common setting in which civil rights complaints
arise. "Civil rights law, namely Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VI"), creates numerous methods for an aggrieved employee to seek
redress regarding equal employment opportunity ("EEO") or affirmation
action ("AA") complaints."100 However, while these formal procedures are
98. Id. at 8. A major concern of the Work Group dealt with the fact that a mediator's choice
of what information to provide to participants "may constitute the unauthorized practice of law, as
the mediator makes conscious decisions about what information applies to the case." Id.
99. Ellen Waldman, The ADA Mediation Guidelines: Providing Direction in an Emerging
Field, MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. May/June 2000, at 523-24. Waldman argues that
problems arise where "surrogates can[not] effectively put themselves in the shoes of the
incapacitated party and make decisions that mirror those that would have been made by the party...
[i]t may be better to simply call for an end to the mediation process when party capacity cannot be
achieved." Id.
100. Lauren B. Edelman, et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights
in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 497 (1993).
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available to the employee whose civil rights have been violated, many
employers have established internal informal dispute resolution procedures
for resolving employment discrimination disputes. Employers internalize
the resolution of employment controversies in an attempt to avoid lawsuits,
liability, and the involvement of any civil rights regulatory agencies.01 In
fact, a majority of EEO and AA complaints do not even reach the court
system or even administrative agencies charged with civil rights
enforcement, and thus employment controversies are often resolved through
the internal dispute resolution procedures established by employers. 102
In using internal ADR procedures, personnel within the employer's
organization are charged with handling discrimination complaints.'0 3 These
"complaint handlers" go into ADR with the goal of achieving and
maintaining good employee relations, which, in turn, employers believe will
ensure efficiency and productivity in daily operations.'14 In so doing, the
complaint handlers effectively shift the focus of ADR from the law to
managerial goals.'0 5 In other words, allegations of civil rights violations are
merely seen as a "typical managerial problems" which must be resolved to
maintain "smooth functioning of the organization."' 0 6 As a result of this
narrow outlook on resolving civil rights complaints in the employment
arena, the focus shifts more to resolving the conflict at hand instead of
realizing or defining the legal rights at issue, and a concern over civil rights
violations turns into a concern for maintaining highly functional
interpersonal relationships.'07
This conflict between organizational efficiency and adequately
addressing violations of the employee's civil rights is fueled by civil rights
legislation, which disrupts the "smooth functioning of the organization" by
effectively intervening in the relationship between the employer and his
employees. Such legislation does so by imposing requirements upon the
101. Id.
102. See generally Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes:
Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 525, 540, 563-64 (1981).
103. Edelman et al., supra note 100, at 498.
104. Id. at 511.
105. Id.
106. Id.
One of the major goals of personnel management is to achieve and maintain good
employee relations, which, according to managerial lore, helps to assure efficiency and
productivity in organizations' core activities. While history has seen many changes in the
ideology and techniques of management, the goal of managing employer/employee
relations so that they do not disrupt production has remained largely unchanged.
Id. (citing CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY (New York: Random
House 1986) (1986)).
107. Id.
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employer and establishing procedures for employees to seek redress where
those requirements are not fulfilled. 10 8  Organizational efficiency is
jeopardized by civil rights statutes and judicial interpretations thereof, which
provide support for an employee's claim of discriminatory employment
practices, and which give weight to such claims through the threat of
litigation.' 09
Internal ADR was designed by the employer to resolve disputes, thus
keeping them "out of the formal legal system," while at the same time
maintaining the status quo of the organization." 0
Unfortunately, this streamlined approach towards resolving employment
disputes may subvert the civil rights of the aggrieved employee. First,
complaint handlers are not lawyers, and thus they do not have a complete
understanding of the civil rights law applicable to a given complaint
situation."' Instead, these complaint handlers are of the perspective that fair
treatment, and not necessarily strict adherence to the black letter of civil
rights law, should rule the day." 2 These complaint handlers place much
more importance on procedural fairness than they do on fulfilling the
substantive requirements of the applicable civil rights law."3 In so doing,
the complaint handlers, who are evidently given much control over the
outcome of the internal ADR process, remove "the focus from legal rights to
good organizational governance," and effectively subvert such goals of civil
rights legislation as racial or gender equality in the workplace, in favor of
corporate efficiency. 14
108. Id. at 512.
109. Lauren B. Edelman, et al., Professional Construction of the Law: The Inflated Threat of
Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 47, 78 (1992).
110. Edelman, et al., supra note 100, at 512.
111. Id. at 513.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 513-14.
114. Robert Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories
of Equality, 59 N.C. L. REV. 531, 540 (1981). As Edelman explains:
There is a debate over whether antidiscrimination law permits race- and gender-conscious
treatment to produce fair outcomes, or requires race- and gender-blind treatment, which
assures equality of treatment but not outcome. In both cases, however, there is explicit
attention to race and gender issues. The organizational construction of law, on the other
hand, emphasizes only the need for consistency, thus reducing (if not eliminating) public
attention to the need for race and gender equality.
Edelman et al., supra note 100, at 515 n.19.
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Second, the due process protections provided in the formal court system
to safeguard the rights of the parties are not incorporated into internal ADR
processes." 15 Lawyers are very rarely permitted to participate in internal
ADR, and complaint handlers do not follow any standardized procedures
regarding the admissibility of evidence.16 Such procedural safeguards are
established in the formal legal system to "check bias on the part of
decisionmakers and to compensate for power differences between
parties."'" 7  However, because internal ADR lacks these steps, the civil
rights of aggrieved employees cannot be protected as adequately as if they
had an opportunity to seek redress for discrimination in the formal legal
system.
Perhaps the greatest flaw of the use of internal ADR (and ADR in any
form, for that matter) is that the process is not concerned with defining
discrimination and "articulating a standard to which others can appeal."'" 8
Rather, emphasis is placed on resolving the dispute at hand in a neat and
timely manner, as opposed to focusing on recognizing the civil rights of the
complainant and addressing any violations thereof. In the formal legal
setting, and especially where the court system is dealing with civil rights, a
major objective is to determine the legal right at issue and make a finding as
to whether those rights have been violated." 9 This process is often open to
public scrutiny, allows for a "public declaration that a challenged behavior is
or is not discriminatory," and thus has the potential to establish precedent for
future employee complainants seeking to categorize an employer's behavior
as discriminatory.' 20  This contrasts with the process of internal ADR,
whereby all proceedings and determinations of fact are kept confidential.
Internal ADR then does not provide a foundation for aggrieved employees to
build upon when making their claims, and essentially "each employee must
renegotiate the meaning of discrimination.'' In addition, it could be
argued that the lack of precedential value so characteristic of internal ADR
does not have the deterrent effect that the precedent of publicized lawsuits
115. See generally Edelman et al., supra note 100, at 5 19-21.
116. See generally Waldman, supra note 99, at 523-24; Edelman et al., supra note 100, at 519-
21. For example, complaint handlers may allow such thus use of such subjective evidence as
hearsay evidence, which is inadmissible in formal legal proceedings. Edelman, supra note 100, at
519-21. It is difficult to prove the truth of hearsay statements, and thus where a discrimination case
may hinge upon such evidence, it would be unfair to the complainant should such evidence be used
against him or her.
117. Edelman et al., supra note 100, at 521.
118. Waldman, supra note 99, at 524.
119. Id.
120. Edelman et al., supra note 100, at 524-25.
121. Id. at 530.
130
22
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol6/iss1/4
[Vol. 6: 1, 2006]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
may have on some employers, and thus internal ADR does nothing to assure
employees that their civil rights will not be violated 
in the future. 2§
However, some aspects of the internal ADR procedure do protect the
civil rights of employees, and could even prove to be an excellent model for
the use of ADR in other civil rights forums. Internal ADR encourages the
resolution of complaints that may not find a remedy under applicable civil
rights law-in the formal legal setting, if the decisionmaker determines that
the complainant did not present a valid claim, the case is dismissed. In
contrast, complaint handlers go into the process seeking to resolve the
problem; as a result of this all-encompassing approach, internal ADR
ensures that an employee's civil rights concerns will be addressed, as they
often address both cases that involve discrimination, and even those that do
not, in an attempt to resolve all controversies facing the organization.
23
Also, it may be argued that the focus of internal ADR on mending and
maintaining interpersonal relationships may indeed be appropriate where
discrimination has been alleged, as "personality clashes, poor
communication, or bad management practices" are likely sources of
misunderstanding between employer and employee that may amount to a
belief that the employer has discriminated against the employee.
124
However, while these are positive aspects of internal ADR, they are clearly
outweighed by the negative aspects of the process, which jeopardize the
crucial exercise of an employee's civil rights.
B. General Support and Criticism of the Use ofAlternative Dispute
Resolution in Civil Rights Controversies
While the specific areas of environmental controversies, ADA
controversies, and employment controversies provide a good starting point
for examining the positives and negatives of the use of ADR in the civil
rights context, it may be helpful to delve a little deeper into the pros and
cons of the use of ADR in the civil rights context before examining the
propriety and effectiveness of the use of ADR by the ACLU.
122. Id. at 529-30.
123. Edelman, et al., supra note 100, at 518. However, going back to the reality that complain
handlers are mainly concerned with maintaining the smooth operating of the organization, it should
be noted that "[ilnsofar as discrimination complaints stem from illegal discrimination, the
redefinition of legal issues in organizational terms tends to draw attention away from violations of
law," thus subverting the civil rights of the complainant for the sake of organizational efficiency. Id.
at 519.
124. Id. at 522-23.
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1. Support for the Use of ADR in Civil Rights Controversies
The use of ADR is generally endorsed by the American Bar
Association, federal and state legislators, corporate counsel, and some legal
educators.1 25  These proponents of ADR believe that it is a much more
efficient process when compared with the formal legal system, resulting in
saved time and money. 126 According to these supporters, ADR is less time-
consuming than formal legal procedures because it "eliminates many
formalities of judicial proof... , decisionmakers often are familiar with the
subject matter of the dispute, and because jurors need not be selected and
educated., 127  Costs are reduced because mediators and arbitrators are
typically paid less than judges or other formal decisionmakers, 12' and ADR
does not require the extensive support system of clerks, court reporters,
bailiffs, and other law enforcement personnel associated with the
adjudicatory system. 29 Also, the parties involved in ADR may save money,
as attorney representation is not required, and in some cases, attorney
representation may not even be permitted. 30
These savings in time and money make ADR mechanisms much more
accessible for a claimant.' It is argued that complainants who cannot
afford the expense or delay associated with filing a claim through the formal
litigation process may be able to use ADR mechanisms to seek redress. 32
125. Delgado, supra note 33, at 1366.
126. Id. at 1404 n.55 (citing Jim Miranker, Silicon Valley Courts Alternatives to Lawsuits, S.F.
EXAMINER, Dec. 1, 1985, at D1 (a retired judge, now employed to try ADR cases, believes "a couple
of decisions I made saved each side several hundred thousand dollars in attorney's fees")). See also
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37, at 1871 ("[Proponents] claim that ADR will ensure speedy, less
costly, and therefore more efficient case processing. This strand of the [ADR] movement has been
called the quantitative, caseload-reducing, or case management side of ADR and is the main reason
many jurists and court administrators support ADR."). Compare Trubek et al., The Costs of
Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983) (arguing that the costs of court-administered
litigation is less than many ADR proponents claim); Thomas A. Kochan, An Evaluation of the
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, 5
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 233, 241 (2000) ("The 1996 RAND Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice
evaluation of six pilot ADR programs ... [found] no statistical evidence that ADR significantly
affected the time, costs, or attorney perceptions of satisfaction and fairness." However, the RAND
Corporation did find that ADR programs yielded a greater number of monetary settlements than the
traditional adjudicative process.).
127. Delgado, supra note 33, at 1366.
128. EARL JOHNSON, JR. ET AL., OUTSIDE THE COURTS: A SURVEY OF DIVERSION
ALTERNATIVES 1N CIVIL CASES 86 (Nat'l Center for State Courts 1977).
129. Id.
130. JOHNSON, supra note 128, at 86.
131. Delgado, supra note 33, at 1366.
132. Id. See also Kochan, supra note 126, at, 277 ("A recent report of the Society for
Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) recommends that agencies implementing ADR
132
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Also, individuals may feel more comfortable using informal procedures such
as ADR instead of formal court procedures which may be unfamiliar and
intimidating. 13   ADR is beneficial in this sense, as it arguably places more
control into the hands of the parties involved, and thus facilitates a greater
degree of party participation. 134 This may take on great significance in the
civil rights context, where minorities who feel threatened or intimidated by
the formal adjudicatory system may be more eager and willing to file a claim
alleging a civil rights violation.
In addition, proponents of ADR believe that the formal legal process is
not necessarily suited to address certain kinds of disputes. More
specifically, where there is an established, long-term relationship between
parties, the adversarial process is arguably the least effective means of
dispute resolution, "for it focuses only on the symptoms of a problem and
makes little effort to delve into its source."' 135  However, because ADR
procedures have a more holistic approach that focuses on such things as
community values, interpersonal relations, and compromise, ADR may be
more appropriate for addressing disputes that arise between individuals who
must continue to deal with each other long after the dispute is resolved. 136
programs [should] make them available to individuals from all economic classes... . [A]gencies
should guard against creating a two-tiered system in which mediation is available only to the more
affluent... . [T]he mediation program should be designed to account for disparate abilities to
pay.").
133. Id.
134. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37, at 1872.
135. Brett Cattani, From Courthouses of Many Doors to Third Party Intervention, CHRIS. SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 17, 1979, at 12, 13. Examples of such relationships include marriage, next-door
neighbors, and partners in a small business. Id. However, it could be argued that the employer-
employee relationship is another example, and thus civil rights disputes arising in the workplace may
benefit from resolution through ADR as well.
136. Delgado, supra note 33, at 1367. See also Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer,
supra note 12, at 1665:
These advocates [of ADR] seek an understanding of justice in the way Socrates and
Thrasymachus did in the Republic: Justice is not the will of the stronger; it is not
efficiency in government; it is not the reduction of violence: Justice is what we discover-
you and I, Socrates said-when we walk together, listen together, and even love one
another, in our curiosity about what justice is and where justice comes from.
McThenia and Shaffer place great importance on maintaining the relationship between individuals in
a dispute. Id. See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37, at 1872 (stating that ADR promotes both
"reconciliation" and "better communication" between "disputing parties."). However, this
perspective has been criticized, as ADR critics argue that individuals only use the legal system as a
last resort--"[p]eople turn to courts when they are at the end of the road," and thus it seems
preposterous to be concerned with maintaining good relations between the parties to the dispute.
Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1670 (1985) ("[T]o disfavor litigation because you
133
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This could prove crucial in cases involving a civil rights dispute between an
employer and employee, where the employer wishes to continue
employment with the employer after the controversy is resolved. Also, ADR
may produce more complex solutions that are perhaps better tailored to
addressing the parties' needs than traditional adjudicatory processes. 137 This
stems from the fact that in ADR, the mediator or arbitrator can look to the
future, as well as the past, and may involve more parties than the traditional
legal system will permit-this allows ADR to produce solutions that are
more responsive to the needs of both parties and non-parties.' 38  This
contrasts greatly with the formal legal system, which may only examine past
facts in resolving a dispute, despite the fact that it will be attempting to
produce a solution for the future. 139  Thus, while the court system may
effectively establish precedents for future claimants, ADR may be more
beneficial to one whose civil rights have been violated in that it has the
potential to provide a more comprehensive and individualized change in the
life of the complainant, and perhaps even for those who follow, than would a
blanket ruling by the formal legal system.
2. Criticism of the Use of ADR in Civil Rights Controversies
Two main criticisms of the use of ADR in civil rights controversies are
the lack of procedural safeguards present in ADR, and the lack of precedent
associated with ADR decisions. Both of these shortcomings have the
dangerous potential of depriving an aggrieved individual of an appropriate
means for redressing any civil rights violations he may have experienced.
(a.) Lack of Procedural Safeguards in ADR
One can make several valid arguments against the use of ADR in civil
rights disputes. For one thing, opponents of ADR argue that the use of ADR
may facilitate racial or ethnic bias in the resolution of disputes, due to the
hope that social relations between the parties can be restored is like ignoring the dangers of plea
bargaining and favoring it over trial because you wish the crime that gave rise to the prosecution had
not occurred."). In addition, Fiss argues that "[t]here is no reason to assume either that the despair of
blacks over getting justice on their own is unwarranted, or that they sue because they want some
high class counseling. The more reasonable assumption is that they turn to the courts because they
have to." Id. at 1671.
137. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37, at 1872. See also Kochan, supra note 126, at 260 ("One
putative benefit of mediation is that it allows the parties to forge settlements addressing more
personalized interests than is possible in agency or court decisions.").
138. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37, at 1872.
139. Id.
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lack of procedural safeguards in place. 140  The formal legal system has a
number of safeguards in place to ensure that the decisionmaker applies justly
the applicable rules of law.141  Judges are appointed for lengthy terms,
sometimes for life, and thus are not exposed to outside political or societal
pressures which could influence their decision-making process. 142  Also,
judges are trained to analyze a lawsuit in terms "of the legal and factual
issues presented," rather than based upon the characteristics of the parties to
a dispute' 43 -"for example, as a pedestrian-intersection accident case, rather
than one of a black victim suing a white driver."' 44 In addition, the basic
concept of stare decisis prompts the judge to analyze similar cases in a like
manner, and the results of this analysis are subject to appellate review. 141
Finally, judges are required by the Code of Judicial Conduct to disqualify
themselves from any case where their impartiality may be at issue, and
disqualification is essential where the judge feels animus or prejudice
towards a party to the case. 146 In terms of the jury, the process of voir dire
allows for the removal of jurors, with cause, by the judge and/or the parties
to the dispute, 147 while parties may use peremptory challenges to remove
jurors suspected of bias without cause. 14  Such procedural safeguards do
much in the way of "recogniz[ing] inequality and attempt[ing] to
compensate for it by making both parties conform to the same standards.' 49
140. Delgado, supra note 33, at 1367.
141. Id. at 1368. See also Brunet, supra note 26, at 27 ("Whenever a [decisionmaker] lacks a
clear legal standard, impartiality may be more difficult to attain. Legal principles serve a yardstick
or measurement function that allows disputants a way to assess the neutrality of those who decide or
facilitate a dispute. In more skeptical terms, legal rules help keep judges or dispute facilitators
honest because the rules make impartiality more apparent.").
142. Owen M. Fiss, Foreward: The Forms of Justice, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1979) (noting that the federal judiciary may act independent from outside
influence due to life tenure). Compare DAVID STEIN, JUDGING THE JUDGES: THE CAUSE, CONTROL,
AND CURE OF JUDICIAL JAUNDICE 3-4, 35-36 (Exposition Press, 1st ed. 1974) (arguing that the
judicial appointment system requires judges to become political in order to obtain these
appointments).
143. Delgado, supra note 33, at 1368.
144. Fiss, supra note 142, at 13-14.
145. Delgado, supra note 33, at 1368.
146. Id. at 1368-69. Note that "if a judge should disqualify himself or herself, but does not do
so, recusal statutes enable parties to request a new judge." Id. at 1369.
147. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 (1976) (explaining that voir dire may be used to
insure that an impartial jury is impaneled).
148. Delgado, supra note 33, at 1369.
149. Mark Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice the Only Justice is in the Halls, 1 THE POL. OF
INFORMAL JUST. 119, 159 (1982). Lazerson explains his theory that "[a] legal system that
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The use of these procedural safeguards stems from the principal that the
formal legal system presumes that inequality exists between parties to a suit,
and thus implements a matrix of rules and other such mechanisms designed
to protect the weaker party. 50  In contrast, the informal procedures
implemented in ADR "deemphasize[s] these concerns-they presume 'that
the people or entities that interact outside formal legal institutions are
roughly equal in political power, wealth, and social status.'.''  However,
the reality is that inequalities do exist, and thus ADR disadvantages the
weaker party to a suit 2 -in civil rights controversies, this is often the
minority or the poor individual who has been discriminated against. The
procedural safeguards entrenched in the formal legal system attack this
inequality head-on and force both parties to adhere to the same standards of
practice in an attempt to compensate for disparities in power or wealth. 53
However, where these procedural safeguards are absent, such as in ADR
procedures, the weaker party in a civil rights controversy, or other such
dispute, will have little or no success at redressing the wrongs committed
against them.
However, these the likelihood of bias resulting from a lack of procedural
safeguards in the ADR setting may be offset,
[1] by providing rules that clearly specify the scope of the proceedings and forbid
irrelevant or intrusive inquiries, [2] by requiring open proceedings, and [3] by providing
some form of higher review[, and] [4] the third-party facilitator or decisionmaker should
be a professional and be acceptable to both parties .... 1
encourages conciliation between landlords and tenants-two parties with vastly unequal resources-
by curtailing the procedural rights of the weaker can only succeed in amplifying that inequality." Id.
150. Delgado, supra note 33, at 1394.
151. Delgado, supra note 33, at 1394 (citing Abel, Delegalization, Jahrbuch Fur
Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie 27 (H. Von Erhard et al. 1980).
152. Id. Delgado explains that "there is a critical difference between a process like [ADR],
which is based on bargaining and accepts inequalities of wealth as an integral and legitimate
component of the process, and a process like judgment, which knowingly struggles against those
inequalities." Id. at 1398. In fact, "[m]inorities recognize that public institutions, with their defined
rules and formal structure, are more subject to rational control than private or informal structures."
Id. at 1391.
153. Lazerson, supra note 149, at 159. Compare Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues in
Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths, 1995 J. DiSP. RESOL. 55, 64-65 (1995) (stating that
much evidence suggests "continuing discrimination against marginalized groups within the formal
legal system" exists; while the formal legal system does provide parties with equal procedural tools
to place them on the same level, "it does so largely by requiring the parties to battle through
surrogates, i.e., their lawyers, and to use legal arguments and language that does not reflect their
authentic voices or perspectives.").
154. Delgado, supra note 33, at 1403.
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These safeguards may increase the costs of ADR, but, on balance, these
costs seem worth the benefit of ensuring the civil rights of aggrieved
individuals will be adequately protected.
(b.) Lack of Precedent Associated With ADR Decisions
"No discrimination dispute is merely an individual dispute."' Where
race or gender discrimination is evident, the race or gender of the aggrieved
individual is naturally brought into the conflict,'5 6 and this leads to the
involvement of that racial or gender group in the civil rights dispute. 15 7 In
other words, though a civil rights violation "commences as a personal
injustice... [this] should not obscure the intrinsic group nature of the
injustice."'158 Race or gender discrimination should be perceived as a threat
to the civil rights of all members of the group, even though only a single
individual may be directly affected by the dispute at hand. 5 9
Although an apparently isolated act of discrimination seems to affect
only the single individual, it in fact affects all members of the individual's
racial or gender group-these members are shown that "discrimination is
pervasive and that each is a potential target of discrimination.,"' 60 Thus, the
whole community has some interest, or even some stake, in the outcome of
the civil rights dispute of an individual complainant. The danger lies in the
fact that if the individual agrees to a remedy "that leaves discriminatory
institutions, structures, procedures, or people in place," the individual may in
fact place himself, and his group, at risk of future discrimination. 161
155. Emily M. Calhoun, Workplace Mediation: The First-Phase, Private Caucus in Individual
Discrimination Disputes, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 187, 198 (2004).
156. See id.
157. See id. at 199.
158. Id. To further elaborate this point, Calhoun writes that "it is not inappropriate to think
about all discrimination disputes--even those in which the group is not a formal party-as involving
a 'social enterprise' because of the inherent group presence." Id. at 200.
159. See Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and
Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REv. 263, 283-84 (1995) (discussing how a victim of racial
discrimination may find a group identity imposed upon himself). See also E. Tex. Motor Freight
Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Printing Indus.
of Metro. Washington, D.C., 92 F.R.D. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1981); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 139
F.R.D. 657 (D. Minn. 1992) (all exemplifying how courts acknowledge that individual civil rights
claims may have class effects).
160. Calhoun, supra note 155, at 200 (citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF STATE (First Harv. U. Press 1989) (1991)).
161. Calhoun, supra note 155, at 214.
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However, what if the remedy obtained by the individual complainant is
beneficial, and could prove beneficial for his entire community? Therein
lies the problem with ADR-the lack of precedential value garnered by its
decisions. This means that any advancements made are done so on an
individual, rather than a group, level. This is because an agreement reached
through arbitration, mediation, or settlement does not have the same level of
legal significance as a court decision, and does not create any sort of
jurisprudence for future complainants to build upon and use in effectively
forming and shaping their claims. Proof of a pattern of discrimination may
be essential to a complainant's level of success, and the existence of this
pattern may be critical in establishing "a structure whereby victims can be
identified and made whole."' 62 However, ADR and its individually tailored
remedies do little to provide such proof. But such a pattern of
discrimination cannot be established, given the often private or confidential
nature of ADR proceedings. 63  In fact, some ADR methods, such as
settlement agreements, may subvert the public interest in favor of reaping
monetary damages,' 64 thereby neglecting to appreciate the legal significance
of the issues presented by the claim at hand. By giving the individual
claimant the leeway to accept a mediocre compromise at the expense of the
group, ADR effectively diminishes the "judicial development of legal rights
for the disadvantaged."'' 65 In other words, the development of law in certain
disfavored or unpopular areas would be almost completely stifled. For
example, while the civil rights movement made great strides during the
1960s and 1970s, "imagine... the impoverished nature of civil rights law
that would have resulted had all race discrimination cases ... been mediated
rather than adjudicated."' 166  Thus, opponents of ADR argue that some
162. Brief of Amici Curiae Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al., at 4, Green
Tree Financial Corp. et al. v. Bazzle, et al., 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003) (No. 02-634).
163. See Maute, supra note 35, at 524-26. For example, "[miany settlement agreements
routinely include confidentiality provisions, which seal the court records to prevent public
disclosure." 1d. at 525-26.
164. See Elizabeth Kolbert, Chief Judge of New York Urges Less Secrecy in Civil Settlements,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1990, at Al. Provisions included in civil settlement agreements preserve the
secrecy of the settlement terms and seal the court records. Id. Much focus has centered on how such
provisions harm the public interest. Id. See also Maute, supra note 35, at 524-25 ("Private disputes
between parties of relatively equal power are good candidates for mediation. If the dispute is truly
private, no important public values will be compromised or subverted through settlement.").
165. Edwards, supra note 20, at 679. It has been suggested that ADR should not be used (1)
"[w]hen the dispute involves important unsettled questions of law affecting the public interest" or (2)
"where there are substantial differences in respective power, bargaining ability, or vulnerability of
parties .... Maute, supra note 35, at 527. Both of these criteria are highly characteristic of civil
rights disputes involving race, gender, or disability.
166. See id.
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hesitation should be used before applying ADR to resolve a civil rights
dispute.
This lack of precedent opens the door for the presence of so-called
"repeat players."' 6  In litigation, repeat players, such as Wal-Mart, have a
distinct advantage over adversaries. 68 Namely, these repeat players are
more sufficient in the mobilization of legal and other resources, which
increases the benefit they receive from engaging in formal adjudication. 169
Such benefits include the ability to develop "advance intelligence" (i.e., an
ability to understand how certain issues will play out in court under
applicable laws), and the ability to effectively "plan for future
engagement."' 170  Repeat players may also develop long-term working
relationships with "institutional incumbents" such as clerks or judges. 171 If
these advantages for the repeat player translate from the litigational to the
ADR setting, they could prove extremely detrimental to the complainant
citing a civil rights violation. In the ADR context, the repeat player often
has the leverage to control the forum, decisionmaker, and rules in order to
gain the most favorable outcome. 172 Often this complainant is already in a
disadvantaged position when compared to the alleged offender, and the
status of the offender as a repeat player could only enhance the disparity
between the power and influence which the parties are capable of exhibiting.
Thus, due to the lack of precedence associated with ADR procedures, repeat
players are often allowed to re-litigate (in some sense) issues addressed in
previous ADR proceedings, and the complainant must deal with the fact that
he has no previous decisions upon which to mold or shape his claim, in
addition to the other disadvantages he experiences (i.e., wealth, community
status, etc). In this sense, ADR could prove extremely detrimental in the
civil rights context.
167. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37, at 1905-06 (citing Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead. Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974)).
168. Id.
169. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 19, 26 (1999) (citing Galanter,
supra note 167, at 98-103).
170. Id. at 27.
171. Id. (citing Galanter, supra note 167, at 100-01, 123-24).
172. Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951, 985 (1997). In Engalla, Kaiser
maintained a self-administered arbitration program, chose the partisan arbitrator and third-party
neutral arbitrator, and used its own counsel to manage the entire process. Id. at 951. This is an
illustrative example of how corporations often control the nature and outcome of ADR disputes,
much to the disadvantage to the complainant.
139
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In short, the complainant should participate in ADR if he "wants relief
for the immediate problem, and cares little about creating precedent for the
future."'173 However, if the complainant is concerned with establishing new
precedent in the area of civil rights in an attempt to thwart future
discrimination, ADR seems to be an improper choice for doing so.
IV. USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY THE ACLU
The stated mission of the ACLU is "to defend and preserve the
individual rights and liberties guaranteed to all people in this country by the
Constitution and laws of the United States., 174 The ACLU attempts to do so
mainly by filing lawsuits on behalf of those who believe their civil rights
have been violated. However, several of these lawsuits have not been
formally adjudicated but have been settled instead. This section of the
article illustrates some examples of cases which the ACLU has resolved
using ADR mechanisms, and discusses whether the resolution of civil rights
disputes through such mechanisms may truly serve the mission and purpose
of the ACLU. More specifically, does ADR actually effectuate a change
which can be appreciated by all, even those not involved in the suit at hand?
A. Examples of the Use ofAlternative Dispute Resolution by the ACLU
The ACLU has engaged in ADR in the arenas of employment,
disability, gender, and educational rights. The form of ADR most
commonly used by the ACLU is settlement negotiation.
75
The use of ADR in the employment setting is supported by the ACLU if
it is "voluntary and meets reasonable standards of fairness.' 76  More
specifically, ADR should only be allowed where sufficient due process
protections are present. 177 The ACLU believes that ADR may effectively
increase the number of individuals able to obtain a just resolution to their
employment disputes, which is essential given the fact that 50,000 of the
200,000 civil rights complaints received by the ACLU annually arise out of
173. Maute, supra note 35, at 523. In contrast, if the complainant believes that "the legal
principles are of overriding importance, they should move for exclusion from [ADR]." Id.
174. Freedom is Why We're Here, supra note 1.
175. See generally Zelin, supra note 42.
176. Lewis L. Maltby, The National Workrights Institute (Apr. 6, 1994),
www.workrights.org/issue-dispute/adr_ statement_4-6-94.html.
177. Id. Such due process protections include "notice, access to relevant information, the
opportunity to confront ones accusers, and an impartial decision maker can be provided without
great cost or delay. Other aspects of due process... [include] formal discovery and judicial
review." Id.
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workplace discrimination claims.17 This is significant, given the fact that a
number of individuals cannot afford the $5,000-10,000 cost associated with
litigating an employment dispute, and ADR provides a method for
redressing the wrongs of a majority of individuals whose cases do not have a
large enough economic potential to induce an attorney to take their case
based on contingency.179  The ACLU has focused much of its attention
specifically on the practice of employment-at-will. According to the ACLU,
about 150,000 employees are fired annually "for no legitimate reason" under
the "'archaic 19th century doctrine' of 'employment at-will."" 0 An ACLU
task force on civil liberties in the workplace suggests that only government
and unionized employees are protected against these potentially
discriminatory firings, thereby leaving 60 million employees vulnerable to a
greater potential for having their civil rights violated.' These individuals
will likely have limited access to the judicial system, and must instead
redress the wrongs committed against them through the ADR process. For
such individuals, the ACLU has proposed several structural models under
which aggrieved claimants could safely exercise their civil rights in the
employment forum. Under the first model, an employee who feels wrongly
terminated should be entitled to challenge the firing decision before a panel
of impartial arbitrators. 82  Allowing the aggrieved an opportunity to be
heard before such a panel would cost $2,500 and prove a more expedient
alternative to the lengthy $250,000 court case. 183 Under the second model,
mediators would be allowed to try and settle disputes, and only if the
mediators failed would any form of arbitration be an option. 84 Thus, in the
case of employment disputes which will not be aired in the formal legal
system, the ACLU is willing to engage in, and actually supports, the use of
ADR mechanisms.
The ACLU also employs the use of ADR techniques to resolve
disability discrimination cases. Such claims most often involve allegations
of ADA violations, and are commonly resolved through settlement
178. Maltby, supra note 176.
179. Id.
180. Sherwood Ross, ACLU Pushes to Abolish Unjust, Arbitrary Firings, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
May 26, 1993, at C5 (quoting Teresa Yates, ACLU field coordinator on unjust firings).
181. Id. atC5.
182. Id. One way to ensure the impartiality of arbitrators would be to allow a neutral third-
party to select any arbitrators used. See also Maltby, supra note 176.
183. Sherwood, supra note 180, at C5.
184. Harry Bernstein, Dupe Shouldn't Be Used as a Union Label, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1987, at
Business 4.
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agreements. 185  Often these agreements occur at the city, and sometimes
even the county, levels. 86 Such settlement agreements are often the product
of an intense period of negotiations, and are subject to the approval of the
federal district court. 87 The settlement agreements formulated by the ACLU
often call for "top-to-bottom changes" in either the city or county "programs
and facilities to ensure access for people with disabilities, and awar[d] ...
damages and costs. 18 8 Often the city or county involved is prepared to take
a proactive approach in enacting the goals of the settlement agreement in a
manner which could likely serve as a model for other public officials dealing
with the same or similar issues in civil rights. 89 The ACLU ensures that
such settlement agreements in the disability rights arena specifically provide
for: the training of officials on disability issues so that they are better
equipped to deal with such conflicts in the future, tangible or physical
reforms to be enacted in the immediate future (i.e., construction of ramps for
accessibility), a more efficient complaint system, and some sort of
procedural structure which may be used to monitor compliance with the
standards of the settlement.190 Thus, the ACLU will engage in dispute
resolution in the disability discrimination context if any settlement
agreement reached is explicit in the means by which the rights of the
complainant will be rectified.
ADR techniques are also used by the ACLU to resolve conflicts in the
gender discrimination arena. Settlement agreements are often viewed by the
ACLU as a tool for facilitating the initiation of the process through which
injustice towards women on the local scale is remedied.19' Also, the ACLU
views the settlement agreement as a means by which the principles of gender
equity are expanded to "other public facilities and institutions" within the
local area.1 92  In order to accomplish these civil rights objectives in the
gender discrimination setting, the ACLU includes in its settlement
185. ACLU Announces Model Settlement in Maryland Disability Rights Challenge (Dec. 2000),
http://www.aclu.org/DisabilityRights/DisabilityRights.cfm?ID=8220&c=70.
186. Id. See also, In Landmark Settlement, ACLU Wins New Guarantees For Mobility
Impaired Bus Passengers in Los Angeles (Aug. 2000),
http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfmID=8066&c=75.
187. In Landmark Settlement, supra note 185.
188. Id.
189. ACLUAnnounces Model Settlement, supra note 185.
190. Id. For example, a settlement agreement may provide that "[t]he city agrees that once
made accessible, all city buildings and facilities will be maintained in that condition. All new
construction, alterations, programs, services, and activities will be carried out in compliance with the
ADA." Id. at 2.
191. ACLU-SC & CWLC Announce Settlement of Significant Lawsuit Against City of Los
Angeles (Oct. 27, 1999), http://www.aclu-sc.org/print/News/Releases/100289.
192. Id.
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agreements the adoption of some sort of program or process which will
ensure the equal participation and enjoyment of men and women in currently
existing local activities. 193 Oftentimes the ACLU designs the program such
that it serves as "a showpiece for the rest of the nation," and closely
monitors the program included in the settlement agreement to ensure that it
indeed "translates into exciting programs and activities for girls. 1 94 Thus,
the use of ADR by the ACLU in the gender discrimination context focuses
more on altering existing structures through new programs rather than
changing the underlying system completely.
Finally, the ACLU has employed the use of ADR to resolve disputes in
the education discrimination arena. The ACLU is often presented with
claims that students have "been denied the most basic educational tools" and
are expected to attend class in "minimally acceptable learning conditions,' 5
compared to their counterparts in wealthier, more affluent school districts.
To rectify this discrimination, the ACLU has consistently required
settlement agreements with extremely stringent requirements which will
have a more permanent, long-lasting impact. More specifically, settlement
agreements entered into by the ACLU in the education discrimination
context often make specific requirements that students have new books and
other educational tools, that teachers meet certain qualification standards,
that schools are held accountable for delivering all of the demands made in
the agreement, and that the district, county, or even the state must provide
the funding necessary to accomplish these goals. 196  The settlement
agreements endorsed by the ACLU in fact require legislation to create new
standards for educational materials and facilities, to collect and verify data
on compliance with these standards, to provide for some means of
intervention should the school, city, county, and/or state fail to fulfill these
standards, and to implement some form of a system for inspecting the
quality of educational facilities under the purview of the settlement
193. Id. An example of such a program is "Raise the Bar." "Raise the Bar" ensures that girls in
the City of Los Angeles will have equal access to all city-sponsored sports and recreation programs,
in addition to equal access to all city-owned sports facilities. Id. The program resulted from the
settlement of a lawsuit in which girls in Los Angeles alleged that they did not have equal access to
the athletic and recreational programs, services, and facilities sponsored by the city through the
Department of Recreation and Parks. Id.
194. Id.
195. Historic Settlement Requires California to Provide Equal Educational Opportunity to
Compton Students (Mar. 21, 2000), http://www.aclu-sc.org/print/News/Releases/100204.
196. ACLU and State of California Reach Settlement in Historic Williams Education Lawsuit
(Aug. 13, 2004), http://www.aclu-sc.org/print!News/Releases/100740.
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agreement.' 97 Thus, ADR in the educational context is expected to produce
results of a perhaps more permanent and far-reaching character than ADR in
other civil rights settings addressed by the ACLU.
B. ADR and the Mission of the ACLU
The mission of the ACLU is to defend the civil rights "guaranteed to all
people in this country by the Constitution and laws of the United States" by
selecting to take on only those lawsuits which will establish new precedents,
thereby having the greatest impact in the preservation of civil liberties. 98
However, as discussed in the previous section, the ACLU must often settle
its lawsuits through the use of ADR mechanisms. In doing so, an issue is
raised as to whether the mission of the ACLU is furthered where ADR is
applied to resolve civil rights controversies, as ADR does not have the legal
force and authority that formal adjudicative decisions have.
ADR used by the ACLU in civil rights disputes may be said to serve
private interests at the expense of broader public goals, such as the
advancement of civil rights. If such is the case, this will be extremely
detrimental to minorities, the poor, women, and other disadvantaged groups
"to the extent that they benefit most from the public policies underlying
formal legal processes."' 99  While the ACLU does provide the poor or
minority complainant with more leverage at the bargaining table than he or
she would have without such representation, this does not negate the fact
that poor individuals or minorities who are not parties to the current action
will not necessarily experience an improvement in their civil rights status.
Oftentimes the settlement agreements entered into by the ACLU provide an
immediate solution or remedy for the given locality in which the civil rights
dispute arose, but do nothing to further the civil rights interests of those in
other neighboring regions. For instance, the ACLU may enter into a
settlement agreement with the City of Los Angeles to eradicate the presence
of discrimination in the educational setting by providing the necessary
educational tools, resources, and funding required to enact such a change.
197. ACLU and State of California, supra note 196.
198. Freedom is Why We're Here, supra note 1.
199. Delgado, supra note 33, at 1398. For example,
[s]ettlement is unconstrained by the party equality that underlies formal legal processes.
An imbalance of power can distort the settlement process in a number of ways: (1) the
poorer party will be less able than the wealthier party to predict the outcome of litigation
and thus will be in an inferior bargaining position; (2) the poorer party may be in great
need of damages and thus willing to settle for a smaller sum rather than wait for a larger
recovery through litigation; and (3) the poorer party may be forced to settle simply because
she cannot afford to hire counsel or finance litigation, regardless of the merit of her claim.
Id.
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However, this agreement does nothing to advance the rights of students in
any other city in the surrounding region, and thus serves as a narrowly
tailored remedy of a civil rights violation which is likely widespread and
commonplace in other cities in the same school district as Los Angeles.
While the agreement may serve as an excellent model for other cities, school
districts, counties, or even states, these localities are by no means obligated
or required to adopt similar provisions; in fact, these localities may even
make the determination that there is no discrimination present to warrant
such civil rights reforms. Without the force of law to support it, ADR is not
able to create standards in the areas of civil rights which must be adhered to
by all. Rather, ADR remedies individual grievances without regard for the
advancement of the rights of all, and further the objectives of the ACLU on a
very confined local level.
ADR agreements also lack the precedential value so coveted by the
ACLU in its pursuit of the perfect civil rights lawsuit to represent. While
those within the affected area may benefit from an ADR agreement that
results in more permanent, far-reaching change, for those in other cities,
counties, or states, an agreement produced through ADR carries no
precedential value and, at best, may only be used as persuasive evidence in
proving a civil rights violation. This lack of precedence in the ADR arena is
less than desirable. In the adjudicative system, "judgment is not the end of a
lawsuit but only the beginning."200 Involvement of the court may continue
"almost indefinitely" as third-party enforcement of a judgment is often
necessary (i.e., through the contempt power of the court). However, ADR
often does not provide for a manner of enforcing agreements, and parties to
a settlement agreement may be left without remedy if one or the other side
decides to avoid compliance.20 2 In addition, court involvement in a case
may continue indefinitely as a body of law is continuing to develop-such is
the case in the civil rights arena, where much has been accomplished, but
much remains to be done in terms of establishing legal guidelines to protect
against discrimination, especially in developing areas like homosexual
rights. ADR thwarts the ACLU in its attempt to achieve these goals by
effectively preventing cases from reaching the judicial system, a system in
which decisions can be built upon and the body of law supporting civil rights
may be edified to truly protect the rights of all. In other words, "while
200. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082 (1984).
201. Id. at 1082-84.
202. That is, unless the settlement is the result of a court order, in which case the court may
play a role in enforcement.
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settlement may produce peace between parties, it fails to further the
substantive public goals that shape adjudication. 2 03  Surely the ACLU's
involvement in ADR does little in the long-term to further its goal of
"defend[ing] and preserv[ing] the individual rights and liberties guaranteed
to all people in this country by the Constitution and laws of the United
States" due to the simple fact that ADR processes lack precedential value.
CONCLUSION
ADR has the potential to decrease the costs and time associated with
litigation, thereby increasing the possibility that poor or minority
complainants may have a better chance of seeking redress for any civil rights
violations which may have been committed against them. However, ADR
also carries many risks to not only the poor or minority complainant, but
also to those in his or her social class or minority group. Due to the lack of
procedural safeguards and the absence of precedential value associated with
ADR, ADR may result in gains for the individual with no result for the class
discriminated against. For these reasons, the ACLU should proceed with
caution when using ADR procedures to remedy civil rights violations, for
ADR does not necessarily enact the type of change which the ACLU strives
for. However, because the ACLU has the resources to effectively represent
the poor or minority claimant in negotiations, and the redress of civil rights
violations can occur through the use of ADR (albeit on the individual or
local level), ADR is indeed better than no method for addressing the alleged
wrong.
203. Delgado, supra note 33, at 1399.
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